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[L. A. No. 19887. In Bank. May 3, 1948.] 
WARNER BROS. PICTURES, INC. (a Corporation), 
Appellant, T. JOAN BRODEL et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Infants-Oontracts-D1saflirmance.-Civ. Code, § 36, declariDg 
that "a minor cannot disaffirm a contract" approved by the 
court does not permit the minor to disaflirm the contract during 
the second period referred to in § 35, namely, within a. rea-
sonable time after majority, since § 35 grants the right of 
disaffirmance before or after majority only in cases "other 
than those specified in section thirty-six and thirty-sevcn," 
and since it speaks of disaffirmance after majority as dis-
affirmance ''by the minor," and thus· specifies the status of 
the person when he made the contract, not his status when ' 
he disaffirms it. 
[1] See 14 Oa1.Jur. 124; 27 Am.Jur. 771. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2, 10-12, 14] Infants, § 10; 
[3-S) Contracts, 117; (9) Injunctions, §21; [13] Master and 
Servant, 127; [15] Appeal and Error, § 967. 
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[2] Id.-Contracts-Disaftirmance.-Disaf'firmance of a contraet, 
executed or executory, whether declared before or after 
majority has the effcct of a rescission. 
[3] Contracts-Consent-Option.-An option agreement is a con-
tract distinct from the contract to which the option Telates, 
since it does not bind the optionee to perform or to enter into 
tbe contract on the terms specified in the option. 
[4] Id.-Oonsent-Option.-An option contract, in which the 0p-
tionor stipulates that for a specified or reasonable period 
he waives the right to revoke the offer, is different from the 
contract to which the irrevocable offer of the optionor re-
lates, for the optionee by parting with special consideration 
for the binding promise of the optionor refrains from binding 
himself with regard to the contract or conveyance to which 
the option rclates. 
[5] Id.-Consent-Option.-While an optionee incurs no liability 
with regard to the contract or conveyance as to which he 
holds an option, the optionor has irrevocably promised npon 
the exercise of the option to perform the contract or make the 
conveyance on the terms specified in his binding offer, and 
the creation of the final contract requires no promise or other 
action by the optionor because the contract is completed by 
the acceptance of the offer by the optionee. 
[6] Id.-Consent-OptioD.-An option contract gives the optionee 
a right agninst the optionor for performance of the contract 
to which the option relates upon the exercise of the option, 
which the optionor cannot defeat by repudiating the option. 
[7] Id.-Consent-Option.~ince an optionor promises to per-
form the contract to which the option relates, subject to a 
condition at the discretion of the optionee, an option contract 
involves on the part of the optionor a unilateral promise to 
perform the obligations of the contract to which the option 
relates. . 
[8] Id.-Consent-OptioD.-The granting of an option for a con-
tract of employment by a prospective employee to a prospec-
tive employer involves a binding promise of the optionor 
to perform services upon specified terms and thus constitutes 
on his part a contract to perform or render services. 
[9] Injunctions-Contract Rights.-An employee can be enjoined 
from performing extraordinary services to others during a 
period for which his employment under a contract of employ-
ment has been extended by the exercise of an option of the 
employer. 
[10] Infants-Contracts-Disa1llrmance.-The fact· that the prom-
ise of a minor to render services in an option agreement is 
[6] See 6 CaLJur. 27; 12 Am.Jur. 524. 
) 
7GB WABNER BROS. PICTURES 1). BRODEL [31 C.2d 
subject to the condition precedent that the option beexer-
cised, does not make inapplicable Civ. Code, § 36, prohibiting 
minors from disaffirming contracts for dramatic services ap. 
proved by the court. 
[11] Id.-Contracts-Disafllrmance.-Options giving an emploY1!r 
the right to extend a minor motion picture actress' employ. 
ment for a number of consecutive years at a progressivel;l' 
higher salary, included in a contract providing for employment 
of the minor for a year at a designated !!alary per week, can be 
approved by the court as part of a contract of employment, 
even if they are not in themselves contracts to pcrform 
or render services within the meaning of Civ. Code, § 36, 
prohibiting minors from disaffirming contracts for dramatic 
services approved by the court. 
[12] Id.-Contracts-Disafllrmance.-The provisions of Civ. Code, 
§ 36, regarding the submission of contracts of minors for court 
approval, are based on a policy different from the policy of 
the law to discourage adults from contracting with infants, 
which underlies the right of minors to disaffirm their COD-
tracts. The purpose of such provisions is to enable minors 
entering upon a professional career to make contracts with 
employers reasonably protecting the interests of both parties. 
[13] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Duration. 
-Lab. Code, § 2855, which prohibits the enforcement of 
contracts for employment o~er a period of more than seven-' 
years, applies to the term of employment of minors under 
contracts specified in Civ. Code, § 36. 
[14] Infants-Contracts-Disaffirmance.-Inasmuch as there are 
reasonable grounds for the statutory provisions withdraWIng 
the right of disaffirmance from minors with regard to eon-
tracts to render services in the professions specified in Civ. 
Code, § 36, if such contracts are found reasonable by a court 
in a special proceeding for the examination thereof, the statute 
does not violate constitutional rights of such a minor under 
the equal protection of laws clause of the federal Constitution 
or under the provisions of the state Constitution against spe-
cial legislation. 
[15] Appeal-Review-Pleadings--Judgment on Demurrer.-On 
appeal from a judgment dismissing an action on sustaining a 
general demurrer, the reviewing court is not concerned with 
the type of relief to which plaintiff may be entitled. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Alfred E. Paonessa, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief and for an injunction. J udg-
ment for defendants on sustaining demurrers to complaint 
without leave to awend, reversed. 
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Freston & Files, Ralph E. Lewis and Gordon L. Files for 
Appellant. 
Oscar R. Cummins, Jennings & Belcher, Frank Belcher, 
Max Radin, Aaron J. Blackman and Robert Kingsley for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-On March 27, 1942, plaintiff, a producer of 
motion pictures, entered into a written agreement with de-
fendant Brodel, then a minor seventeen years of age, wherein 
the latter promised to perform dra:m.atic services exclusively 
for plaintiff "for and during the term of the agreement." 
The instrument provided that "the term of this contract" 
should commence on March 30, 1942, and continue thereafter 
for 52 weeks; that during this period defendant should re-
ceive a weekly salary of $600; and that "in consideration of 
the terms and covenants of this agreement and of the consent 
of the producer to the amount of compensation as herein set 
forth" plaintiff should have six separate options to extend 
the term of defendant's employment for additional successive 
periods of 52 weeks each, at a progressively higher salary, 
namely, $750, $1,000, $1,250, $1,750 and $2,250 per week. 
Under section 36 of the Civil Code the agreement was sub-
mitted to the Superior Oourt of Los Angeles Oounty for ap-
proval, and on May 12, 1942, the court approved the agreement 
and incorporated it in its order. This incorporation makes it 
clear that the court approved the whole agreement including 
the options. 
When this order was made, the pertinent provisions of 
section 36 read as follows: "A minor cannot disaffirm a con-
tract, otherwise valid, to perform or render services as actor, 
actress, or other dramatic services, as participant or player 
in professional sports, including, but without being limited to, 
professional boxers, professional wrestlers and professional 
jockeys, where such contract has been approved by the supe-
rior court of the county where such minor resides or is em-
ployed. Such approval may be given on the petition of either 
party to the contract after such reasonable notice to the 
other party thereto, as may be fixed by said court, with oppor-
tunity to such other party to appear and be heard." 
Defendl1Ilt performed her obligations under· the agreement 
for the first 52 weeks, and, when plaintiff elected to exercise 
the first three options, she continued to· perform for three 
11 C.Jd-U 
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additional periods of 52 weeks each. In January, 1946, Qe]:enICl~li 
ant reached her majority. On February 13, 1946, Y'a,uu.,I,lf.l 
gave notice to defendant of its election to exercise the 
option. Defendant replied' by notifying plaintiff that 
disaffirmed her agreement and would render no further 
ices to plaiutiff. Immediately thereafter she entered into 
agreement with the other defendants, also motion-picture 
ducers, to perform dramatic services for them. . 
Basing its calise of action on the foregoing facts alleged ill . 
its complaint together with the allegation that when the other 
defendants entered into their contract with def611dant Brod~; 
tbey were aware of her obligations toward plaintiff and con-;' 
trived to circumvent plaintiff's rights, plaintiff brought this· 
action for declaratory relief and for an injunction preventing 
defendant Brodel from performing and the other defendants 
from causing her to perform dramatic services for anyone. 
except plaintiff. The trial court sustained demurrers inter- .' 
posed by defendants, without leave to amend, and dismissed 
the action. Plaintiff appeals. 
Plaintiff contends that the approval of the agreement by 
the court deprived defendant Brodel of the right of dis-, 
affirmance. Defendant contends that this approval deprived I 
her of the right of disaffirmance only during her minority 
but did not preclude disaffirmance within a reasonable time 
after she reached majority. Defendant contends also thatj 
section 36 applies only to contracts of employment; that op-. 
tions for a contract of employment are not contracts of em-
ployment; that therefore the court had no power to approve! 
the option features of the agreement; and that the statute 
cannot be applied to the present case without depriving de-
fendant of her constitutional rights under the equal protec-
tion of the laws clause of the United States Constitution and 
the provisions against special laws in section 25 of article IV 
of the California Constitution. 
[1] Section 35 of the Civil Code provides: "In all cases \ 
other than those specified in sections thirty-six and thirty-
seven,. the contract of a minor . . • may be disaffirmed by the 
minor himself, either before his majority or within a reason-
able time afterwards." Section 36 provides that If a minor 
cannot disaffirm a contract" approved by the court. Defend-
ant contends that the use of the phrase "a minor cannot dis-
affirm" in section 36 (italics added) makes it clear that dis-
affirmance of a contract approved by the court is barred only 
for the period of the minority of the party to the . contract 
) 
) 
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and that the minor can disaffirm the contract during the 
second period referred to in section 35, namely, within a 
reasonable time after majority. This contention takes no 
account of the fact that section 35 grants the right of dis-
affirmance before or after majority only in cases "other than 
those specified in section thirty-six and thirty-seven," or of the 
fact that it speaks of disaffirmance after majority as disaffirm-
ance "by the minor," and thus specifies the status of the 
person when he made the contract, not his status when he dis-
affirms it. There is no need to repeat in other sections of the 
Civil Code the provisions in section 35 as to who may dis-
affirm and when disaffirmance may be declared; they are 
part of the law of disaffirmance in that code and must there-
fore be read into other sections of the code relating to dis-
affirmance of contracts of a minor. Moreover, section 36 con-
fers upon the superior courts the power by their approval of 
contracts of minors to remove from the obligations incurred 
therein the uncertainty that otherwise attends contract obli-
gations of a minor because of his right of disaffirmance. 
[2] Disaffirmance of a contract, executed or executory, 
whether declared before or after majority has the e1iect of a 
rescission. (Flittner v. Equitable Life .4ssur. Soc., 30 Cal. 
App. 209, 216 {157 P. 630J; Tracy v. Gaudin, 104 Cal.App. 
158, 160 [285 P. 720) ; see 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), 
§ 231.) If section 36 prohibited disaffirmance of a contract 
approved by the court during minority only, but permitted 
disaffirmance thereof after majority, it would not remove the 
uncertainty attending the right of disaffirmance. If the section 
merely postponed the exercise of the minor'8 right to dis-
affirm, it would thereby only prolong the uncertainty, since 
a minor who intended to disaffirm the contract would have to 
leave the matter in suspense until he reached majority. 
Defendant's contention that a court has no power under 
section 36 to approve an option such as the options in the 
agreement between parties is based on the language of the 
section providing for approval of a contract "to perform or 
render services." Defendant contends that since an agree-
ment granting an option is a contract to keep an offer open 
and as such is distinct from the contract to which the option 
relates, an option for a contract of employment is therefore 
not itself a contract "to perform or render services." [3] It 
is universally accepted that an option agreement is a contract 
distinct from the contract to which the option relates, since 
it does not bind the optionee to· perform or enter into the 
\ 
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contract upon the terms specified in the option. It does no 
follow, however, that by entering into an option contract~; 
whereby he irrevocably promises to render services to the 
optionee upon the timely exercise of the option by the latter., 
an optionor does not enter into a contract "to perform or; 
render services. "J~
[4] In an option contract the optionor stipulates that forjl 
a specified or reasonable period he waives the right to reVOke .... 
the offer. (Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal.2d 449, 452 [122 P.2d 8, 139 
A.L.R. 1032] j Hicks v. Ohristeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716 [164 PI 
395] ; Seeburg v. El Royale Oorp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [1281 
P.2d 362) j Bruce v. Mieir, 120 Oal.App. 287, 290 [7 P.2d 
1037] ; see Johnson v. Olark, 174 Cal. 582 [163 P.1004] j W. G. 
Reese 00. v. House, 162 Cal. 740 [124P. 442] j Tufts v. Mann; 
116 Cal.App. 170, 178 [2 P.2d 500] ; Restatement, Contracts,' 
§ 47.) Such a contract is clearly different from the contract 
to which the irrevocable offer of the optionor relates, for the 
optionee by parting with special consideration for the binding 
promise of the optionor refrains from binding himself with 
regard to the contract or conveyance to which the option 
relates. An option contract relating to the sale of land is 
therefore "by no means a sale of property, but is a sale of a 
right to purchase" (Hicks v. Ohristeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716 [164 
P. 395] j see Smith v. Bangham, 156 Cal. 359, 365 [104 P. 689, 
28 L.R.A. N.S. 522]; Ware v. Quigley, 176 Cal. 694, 698 [169 
P. 377] j Ludy v. Zumwalt, 85 Cal.App. 119, 130-131 [259 P. 
52] j Alegretti v. Gardner, 74 Cal.App. 564, 566 [241 P. 408] ; 
Howard v. Hobson 00., 38 Cal.App. 445, 455 [176 P. 715]; 
Jlenzel v. Primm, 6 Cal.App. 204, 209 [91 P. 754]), or, as 
stated in Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141 [23 N.W.2d 
362, 363, 166 A.L.R. 435] : " ... A contract conferring an 
option to purchase is ... an irrevocable and continuing offer . 
to sell, and conveys no interest in land to the optionee, but 
wsts in him only a right in personam to buy at his election." 
[5] Nevertheless, while the optionee incurs no liability with re-
prd to the contract or conveyance as to which he holds an op-
tion, the optionor has irrevocably promised upon the exercise of 
tile option to perform the contract or make the conveyance 
vpon the terms specified in his binding offer. (Western Union 
rel. 00. v. Brown, 253 U.S. 101, 110 [40 8.0t. 460, 64 L.Ed. 
11)3] j Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141 [23 N.W.2d 362, 
.3, 166 A.L.R. 435] j Richanbach v. Ruby, 127 Ore. 612 [271 
P. 600, 61 A.L.R. 1441] ; 12 Am.Jur. 524-525.) The optionee 
.-arts with consideration only because the optionor bas in-
) 
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curred such liability. The creation of the final contract requires 
no promise or other action by the optionor, for the contract is 
completed by the acceptance of the irrevocable offer of th<l 
optionor by the optionee. I' The contract has already been 
made, as far as the optionor is concerned, but is subject t(. 
conditions which are removed by the acceptance." (Seeburg v. 
El Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [128 P.2d 362] ; see 
Erickson v. Boothe, 79 Cal.App.2d 266, 272 [179 P.2d 611].) 
[6] Thus the option contract gives the optionee a right against 
the optionor for performance of the contract to which the op-
tion relates upon the ex.ercise of the option, which the optionor 
cannot defeat by repudiating the option. (See McGovney, 
Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 644, 646, 654, and cases 
collected in footnote 5, p. 646; Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 
Yale L.J. 641, 656.) [7] Since the optionor promises to 
perform the contract to which the option relates, subject to 
a condition at the discretion of the optionee, an option contract 
involves on the part of the optionor a unilateral promise to 
perform the obligations of the contract to which the option 
relates. (Heller v. Pope, 250 N.Y. 132 [164 N.E. 881, 882] ; 
Lake Shore Country Club v. Brand, 339 Ill. 504 [171 N.E. 
494, 501] ; Robbs v. Illinois Rural etc. Corp., 313 Ill.App. 418 
[40 N.E.2d 549, 551]; Schlein v. Gairoard, 127 N.J.L. 358 
[22 A.2d 539, 540] ; Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141 
[23 N.W.2d 362, 365, 166 A.L.R. 435]; Zora Realty Co. v. 
Gf'een, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445; see 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. 
ed.), pp.175-176; Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 Yale L.J. 641, 
650; Restatement, Contracts, § 12.) [8] It follows that even 
though the option agreement differs from the contract of em-
ployment the granting of an option for a contract of employ-
ment by a prospective employee to a prospective employer in-
volves a binding promise of the optionor to perform services 
upon specified terms and thus constitutes on his part a con-
tract "to perform or render services. " 
[9] The rule of equity that under a contract calling for ex-
ceptional services an employer can enjoin his employee from 
rendering such services to others, has been held applicable 
to options, since "an option, when based on a sufficient con-
sideration, is a contract by which one binds himself to . . • 
perform services," and an employee can therefore be enjoined 
from performing extraordinary services to others during a 
period for which his employment uuder a contract of employ-
ment has been extended by the exercise of an option of the 
I 
\ 
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employer. (Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827, ssi 
[20 A.L.R. 846] ; see Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 PL 
210 [51 A. 973, 90 Am.St.Rep. 627, 58 L.R.A. 227].) "::~i; 
[10] The fact that the promise of the minor to render 
services in an option agreement is subject to the condition" 
precedent that the option be exercised does not make section: 
36 inapplicable. Nothing in that section indicates that a con., 
tract to render services must be unconditional to be approved" 
by the court under that section. Thus a court could approve 
a contract of a minor actor to perform dramatic services made 
subject to the condition that a certain motion picture in' the 
planning stage shall" be produced; or that a certain play shall 
be performed; or that another actor shall not participate in a 
performance. There is no difference between contracts of a: 
minor making the rendering of his services dependent upon 
such conditions, and an option contract making the rendering 
of his services dependent upon the exercise of the option by 
the other party. 
[11] The options granted to plaintiff by defendant were 
included in a contract providing for employment of the minor 
for a period of 52 weeks at a salary of $600 per week. Even 
if they were not in themselves contracts to perform or render" 
services within the meaning of section 36, they can be ap-
proved by the court as part of a contract of employment. 
Section 36 does not prescribe the terms of a contract to 
perform or render services in the professions specified ii1 . 
the section. It is obvious that a contract of a minor for em-"" 
ployment in such professions may reasonably contain many 
provisions other than those specifying the services to be ren- " 
dered and the compensation to be paid therefor. Thus, 8 ". 
minor actor may incur obligations to travel, to participate in :\ 
instruction and training deemed necessary by the employer, ~ 
to refrain from immoral conduct, to attend publicity meetings j 
or social gatherings arranged by the employer, and to cooper-
ate in other respects with the employer in his endeavors to 
attract the attention of the public to the employee. There was 
no need for the Legislature to enact provisions with regard to 
the C<Bdent of the contracts specified in section 36, for the 
Legislature made each contract subject to judicial scrutiny to 
insure that in the light of the reasonable interests of both 
parties it adequately protect the interests of the minor. 
[12) The provisions in section 36 regarding the submission 
of contracts of minors for court approval are based on a policy 
differ_ from "the policy of the law to discourage adultJl 
, 
; 
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from contracting with infants" (Tracy v. Gaudin, 104 Cal. 
App. 158, 160-161 [285 P. 720]; Ji'littner v. EquitabZe Life 
Assur. Soc., 30 Cal.App. 209 [157 P. 630]), which underlies 
the right of minors to disaffirm their contracts. In professions 
in which one frequently begins a career at a tender age, it is 
to the interest of minors tbat they be able to make contracts 
with employers reasonably protecting the interests of both 
parties. To accomplish this purpose broad discretion has been 
vested in the court to which such contracts are submitted. The 
court may consider whether the terms of the contract are rea-
sonable in the light of the then financial and educational in-
terests of the minor as well as the proper development of his 
talents and his chances for success in the profession. This dis-
cretion, which has been vested in the court to enable the parties 
to adjust their contract relations to their needs, would be 
rendered ineffectual to scrve the bests interests of the minor 
if it were not 'applicable to such option provisions as in this 
case. 
An option to extend the term of employment is common to 
contracts of employment in the professions specified in sec-
tion 36. Court decisions relating to contracts of adult per-
formers or players in professional sports evidence the use 
of such option clauses. (Shubert Tlteatrical 00. v. Bath, 271 F. 
827 [20 A.L.R. 486] ; Philadelphia Ball Olub v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 
210 [51 A. 973,90 Am.St.Rep. 627,58 L.R.A. 227].) In con-
tracts of employment with minor actors option clauses are even 
more im:portant, for frequently the employer is contracting 
with persons of no tested ability or established reputation, 
who may prove to have no appeal to the public. (Sec Penfield 
v. Bennett Film Lab., 4 Cal.App.2d 306 [40 P.2d 587].) He 
may reasonably object to committing himself to a long term 
contract of employment or to making large initial investments 
without securing the right to make use of the talents of the 
employee in the future should they meet expectations and· 
find public recognition. The expedient of granting one or 
more options to the employer to extend the term of employ-
ment at an increasing rate of compensation encourages him 
to develop unknown talent; without such an expedient few 
employers would risk the costly sponsorship of such talent. 
[13] Section 2855 of the Labor Code, which prohibits the en-
forcement of contracts for employment extending over a pe-
riod of more than seven years, applies t.o the term of employ-
ment of minors under contracts specified in section 36 (Dc 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Ca1.App.2d 225 
[153 P.2d 983]). There is thus a seven-year limit on the period 
for which an actor can be boUltd by a contract of employment. 
Given that limitation the court considers before approving a 
contract under section 36 whether or not the intercsts of the 
minor are best protected by a contract granting to the employer 
the right to exercise one or more options to extend the term of , 
employment. If the court were precluded from approving 
contracts with such option clauses, even though reasonable 
persons would include them in their contracts,;the employers 
deprived of the protection of such clauses woUld unquestion-
ably offer contracts less favorable to the minors. Such an 
interpretation of section 36 would violate the familiar rule of 
statutory construction that statutes should be given a common 
sense meaning that entails no unreasonable consequences. 
(Dempsey v. Market Street Railway Co., 23Cal.2d 110, 113 
[142 P.2d 929]; Aggeler v. Dominguez, 217 Cal. 429, 434 
[19 P.2d 241] ; Kipp v. B~'llingham, 217 Cal. 527, 530 [20 P.2d 
318]; Telegraph Avenue Corp. v. Raentsch, 205 Cal. 93, 97 
[269 P. 1109, 61 A.L.R. 366] ; Cullerton v. Mead, 22 Cal. 95, I 
98; Loftis v. Superior Court, 25 Ca1.App.2d 346, 359 [77 P.2d 
491] ; California Employment Stab. Com. v. Municipal Court, 
62 Cal.App.2d 781, 785 [145 P.2d 361].) 
Weare here concerned with section 36, as it read before 
the 1947 amendment. In 1947, after the order approving 
the contract between the parties had been entered the pro-
visions of section 36 were amended by the Legislature.· The 
." A. eontract, otherwise' valid, entered into during minorit)', eannot 
be disafiirmed upon that ground either during the actual minorit)' of I 
the person entering into BUell eontract, or at anT time thereafter, in the f 
following eases: 
"I .... 
"2. A. eontract or agreement employing BUeb person u, or wherein ' 
neb person agrees to perform or render aerviees u, an actor, actress, 
or other dramatic performer, or U a participant or player in profes-
lional 'Ports, including, but without being limited to, professional 
boxers, professional wrestlers and professional joekeYl, where sueb eon-
tract or agreement hu been approved by the superior court in the count)' 
in whieb Inch minor resides or is employed. Such approval may be 
given upon the petition of either party to the contract or agreement 
after Inch reasonable notice to the other party thereto u may be fixed 
by said eourt, with opportunity to BUeb other party to appear and be 
heard; and said eourt shall have jurisdiction to approve, and ita 
approval when given shall extend to the whole of said contract or 
agreement, and of all the terms and provisions th&reof, including, but 
without being limited to, any optional or eonditional pl'oYisions con-
tained therein for extension, prolongation or termination of the term 
thereof." 
(State. 1947, ch. 526, § 1.) 
..... 
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intent of the Legislature was to leave no doubt as to the mean-
ing of section 36, and in no wise to change it, for it declared: 
"The amendment made by this act does not constitute a change 
in, but is declaratory of, the preexisting law." (Stats. 1947, 
ch. 526, § 2.) 
[14] It can hardly be questioned that there are reasonable 
grounds for the statutory provisions withdrawing the right of 
disaffirmance from minors with regard to contracts to render 
services in the professions specified in section 36, if such con-
tracts are found reasonable by a court in a special proceeding 
for the examination thereof. Whether certain other groups of 
minors engaged in professions similar to those specified in sec-
tion 36 should be included in the section is a matter of legis-
lative discretion. New legislation such as this ordinarily first 
covers the fields where it is most urgently needed, and may be \ 
extended in the light of experience. (PeopZev. Western Fruit \ 
Growers,22 Cal.2d 494,506 [140 P.2d 13] ; Rainey v. Michel, 
6 Ca1.2d 259, 270-273 [57 P.2d 932, 105 A.L.R. 148] ; Martin \' 
v. Superior Oourt, 194 Cal. 93, 101 [227 P. 762]; Title ct I, 
Document Restoration 00. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 323, 325-
326 [88 P. 356, 119 Am.St.Rep. 199, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 682]; I'll. r6 
McKelvey, 19 Cal.App.2d 94, 96 [64 P.2d 1002] ; Radice v. 
New York, 264 U.S. 292, 296-298 [44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690]; 
i(eokee Ooke 00. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 [34 8. Ct. 856, 
58 L.Ed. 1288] ; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 [27 8.Ot. 
243, 51 L.Ed. 357) ; Oarmichael v. Southern Ooal & Ooke 00., 
301 U.S. 495, 509 [57 S.Ot. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 
1327].) The statute therefore does not violate constitutional 
rights of the defendant under the equal protection of laws 
clause of the United States Constitution or under the provi-
sions of the California Constitution against special legislation. 
Defendants Nero Pictures Inc. and Nebenzal, relying on 
Imperial Ice. 00. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 36 [112 P.2d 631], 
contend that the complaint does not set forth facts sufficient to 
state a cause of action against them on the ground that the 
complaint merely alleges that they had knowledge of the ob-
ligations of defendant toward plaintiff and not that they in-
duced defendant to breach these obligations. It is unnecessary 
to determine whether the allegations in the complaint bring 
plaintiff within the holding of that case, since plaintiff has 
indicated its intent to amend its complaint as soon as oppor-
tunity arises to do so. 
[15] Defendants contend that since it does not appear on 
the face of the contract that the services promised by defend-
) 
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ant Brodel were extraordinary services, plaintiff is not entitled 
to an injunction under sections 2855 of the Labor Code and 
526 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this appeal from a 
judgment dismissing an action upon sustaining a general 
demurrer, we are not concerned with the type of relief to 
which plaintiff may be entitled. If plaintiff's allegations state 
a cause of action and are supported by proof the court may 
grant it any relief consistent with its cause of ~ction (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 580). 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
There can be no quarrel with the conclusion that sec-
tion 36 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1927 (Stats. 1927, 
p. 1917), is constitutional and withdraws the right of dis-
affirmance as to a judicially approved contract to perform 
dramatic services entered into by a minor j but I cannot agree 
with the conclusion that by the language of that section in 
1927 the Legislature accomplished what it belatedly and 
twenty years later (Stats. 1947, p. 1518) said it intended by 
the earlier act. 
Section 34 of the Civil Code permits a minor to make a 
contract to perform personal· services (as limited by specified 
laws not involved), subject to his power of disaffirmance under 
other provisions. Section 35 confers the right of disaffirmance 
by the minor either before his majority or within a reasonable 
time afterwards, except as otherwise specified in section 36. 
The pertinent language of the latter section as it read at the 
time h~re involved is: "A minor can not disaffirm a contract, 
otherwise valid, to perform or render services as actor, ac-
tress, or other dramatic services . . . where such contract has 
been approved by thc superior court of the county where such 
minor resides or is employed. Such approval may be given 
on the petition of either party to the contract after such 
--reasonable notice to the other party thereto as may be fixed I 
by said court, with opportunity to such other party to appear 
and be heard." 
Joan Brodel, when 17 years of age, executed a contract 
whereby she agreed to perform dramatic services exclusively 
for Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., as producer, "for and during 
tile term of this agreement." The "term of this agreement" 
;1 
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was specified to commence on the 30th day of March, 1942, 
and to continue for a period of 52 weeks, at a salary of $600 
per week. By the same instrument she granted to the pro-
ducer six separate "rights or options to extend the term of 
employment" for additional successive periods of 52 weeks 
each at progressively higher weekly salaries. The contract, 
after notice and hearing, was approved by the court. In due 
time the producer elected to exercise the first, second and 
third options, and the artist performed thereunder. On Jan-
uary 26, 1946, the artist arrived at her majority. On Feb-
ruary 13, 1946, within the time stated in the contract, the 
producer gave notice of its election to exercise the fourth 
option. On February 20, 1946, the artist gave written notice 
of disaffirmance and declined to render services pursuant to 
any purported exercise of the fourth and further options. 
The foregoing comprises the substance of the allegations 
of the complaint. The order sustaining the demurrer and 
dismissing the action was based upon the trial court's de-
termination that section 36 vested in the court the power 
to approve only contracts to perform or render dramatic 
services j' that since the grant of a right or option to extend 
the term of the agreement was not such a contract, the right 
of disaflirmance as to such right or option was not taken 
away. 
By section 36, as it read at the time here involved, the right 
was withdrawn as to a minor's contract to perform or render 
dramatic services, where "such contract" had been approved 
by the superior court. "Such approval" might be given upon 
petition, notice and hearing. The court's power was thus 
expressly limited to approval of a minor's contract to perform 
or render dramatic services. Approval of anything beyond 
that was outside of or in excess of the authority vested in the 
court. Since upon approval disaffirmance was prohibited 
only as to contracts to perform dramatic services, approval 
of anything further would accomplish nothing. It would 
be purely gratuitous, and could not deprive the minor of the 
right of disaffirmance otherwise conferred by law. Language 
extending the expressed deprivation should not be judicially 
supplied. 
The specification of a contract to perform dramatic services 
refers to an accepted offer, a present binding obligation to 
perform those services. A valid option is not an accepted 
I 
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offer, but merely binds the optioner to keep open an offer. ' 
It is the sale of a present right to create a future obligation 
to perform. (Hicks v. Christeson, 174 Cal. 712, 716, 718 
[164 P. 395] ; Seeburg v. EZ Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 
4 [128 P.2d 362]; Brickell v. Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd, 10 
Cal.App.17,22 [101 P.16], citing Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law; 
Cline v. HaZl, 107 Okla. 218 [232 P. 31, 33] ; Restatement of ' 
the Law of Contracts, § 47.) There is no obligation to perform 
until the option is exercised, and conceivably the offer may 
never ripen into an obligation to perform. 
The plaintiff objected to this construction and application 
of the language employed by the Legislature, but did not 
question the fact that the words of the contract appeared to 
limit the employment and the promise to perform dramatic 
services to a term of one year from March 30, 1942. It argued 
that the purpose of the enactment would be obviated unless 
the several options to extend the term for the successive 
periods be included within the present obligation to perform 
dramatic services. To the possible answer that it could have 
written a contract for a straight seven-year term the plaintiff ' 
replied that the executed contract had been the standard in 
form for many years. 
The plaintiff invoked the rule of contemporaneous con-
struction. The construction asserted was not express but 
tacit; that is, it was inferred from a consistent failure by 
minor artists for about 20 years or since 1927 to attempt dis-
affirmance of judicially approved contracts, or 10 request 
limited approval by the court, on the ground that disaffirmance 
was not withdrawn as to the option features included within 
a contract to perform dramatic services. This failure, how-
ever, may also be noted as evidence of satisfaction by the 
minors with their contracts. But assuming that such failure 
could create a contemporaneous construction, the rule is never-
theless inapplicable when the statute calls for a difIerent con-
struction. (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, ante, pp. 66, 
74 [187 P.2d 686], citing California Drive-In Resfauranf 
,Ass'" v. CZark, 22 Ca1.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 
1028].) 
The plaintiff also relied on the act of 1947 (supra, Stats. 
1947, p. 1518) which amended the language of section 36 re-
,garding the contract as to which the minor's right of dis-
affirmance was withdrawn upon approval by the court. That 
section now contains the following relating to the contract 
) 
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and the authority of the COurt: I' A contract or agreement em-
ploying such person as, or wherein such person agrees to 
perform or render services as, an actor, actress, or other dra-
matic performer, ... where such contract or agreement has 
been approved by the superior court . . . and said court shall 
have jurisdiction to approve, and its approval when given 
shall extend to the whole of said contract or agreement, and 
all of the terms and provisions thereof, including, but without 
being limited to, any option or conditional provisions con-
tained therein for extension, prolongation or termination of 
the term thereof." Section 2 of the 1947 act states that the 
amendment does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory 
of, the preexisting law. 
Without such a legislative declaration a later amendment 
may be taken as stating the intended meaning of a statute 
before amendment. (De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 
67 Cal.App.2d 225, 232-233 [153 P.2d 983].) The addition 
of the legislative declaration is not a matter of judicial in-
quiry unless it has some weight in determining prior legisla-
tive meaning. It can have no weight where the declaration is 
diametrically opposed to the fact. (California Emp. etc. 
Com. v. Payne, ante, pp. 210, 213-214 [187 P.2d 702].) 
Without that declaration the conclusion is irresistible that the 
change in wording of section 36 was intended as a change in 
meaning. In truth the later inclusion of matters not thereto-
fore mentioned would be taken as a legislative admission that 
at· the time of the prior statute they were either overlooked 
or were not intended to be included. Inasmuch as the 1927 
and 1947 amendments to section 36 provide the express ex-
ceptions to the exercise of the power of disaffirmance conferred 
by section 35, the courts should confine the exceptions within 
the bounds of the plain language employed by the Legislature. 
It does not appear whether the claimed standard form of 
contract for employment of actors in motion picture produc-
tion was in use in 1927. If so, the Legislature by the amend-
ment to section 36 in that year did not indicate awareness 
thereof so as clearly to authorize approval of the entire con-
tract. From the clear language of the 1947 amendment ex-
pressing such intent, it becomes obvious that the Legislature 
was made aware of the facts at least since the commencement 
of the present action. I see no justification for employing the 
expedient of interpretation in accord with the 1947 legisla-
tive declaration to countenance a statutory deprivation of 
\ 
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the defendant '8 right of disaffirmance of which she was not 
thus clearly deprived under the applicable preexisting law;' 
In such case the later amendment becomes a rule for the fu-
ture only. (Matter of Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 209-210 [131 P .. 
352] ; Clayton v. Schultz, 4 Ca1.2d 425, 430 [50 P.2d 446].) ~ 
In my opinion the trial court correctly ruled that the facts; 
stated in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action, I 
and I would affirm the jUdgment. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
, 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 27, 
]948. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
